The Monetary History of America to 1789: A Historiographical Essay by HUMMEL, JEFFREY ROGERS
San Jose State University 
SJSU ScholarWorks 
Faculty Publications Economics 
1-1-1978 
The Monetary History of America to 1789: A Historiographical 
Essay 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
San Jose State University, jeff@jrhummel.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/econ_pub 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL. "The Monetary History of America to 1789: A Historiographical Essay" 
Journal of Libertarian Studies (1978): 373-389. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu. 
Journal ofLibertarian Srudies, Vol. 2, No.4, pp. 373- 389. 0364-6408/78/1201 - 0373 $02.00/0 
© Pergamon Press Ltd. 1978. Printed in Great Britain. 
THE MONETARY HISTORY OF AMERICA TO 1789: 

A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 

JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
Department of History, University of Texas 
In no other field is the crucial importance of 
theory to history more obvious than in the field 
of economic history. One's knowledge of the 
concrete historical events may remain unchang­
ed, but if the economic theory applied to those 
events is altered, then one's entire historical in­
terpretation will of necessity be modified. A 
historical account can be factually accurate and 
yet, if the informing economic theory is faulty, 
give a totally false interpretation. Furthermore, 
the validity of the theory, in economics at least, 
is often decided a priori to history, on some 
other basis. This procedure is not objectionable 
if the historian's theoretical paradigm is ex­
plicit. However, it makes the task of 
historiography more complex. One must not 
only consider the overt interpretations and ex­
planations offered by different historians; one 
must also determine each historian's theoretical 
framework, whether explicit or implicit, and 
subject it to theoretical criticism. 
The monetary history of the British colonies 
in America and of the United States prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1789 is 
extremely varied. Many different monetary ex­
periments were tried by colonial and state 
governments. Unfortunately, the monetary 
theory used by current historians is flawed and, 
consequently, their rendering of the period is 
unsatisfactory. In this paper, I will first 
describe how changing monetary theories have 
been reflected in the historical accounts. Then I 
will criticize the current accounts and, using the 
monetary theory developed by Austrian 
economists, P 1 offer a more accurate reinter­
pretation of the monetary history of the period. 
I 
Before proceeding to an examination of 
specific historians, it is necessary to understand 
a few key concepts and to be familiar with a 
general overview of the specific events. The 
monetary history of America to 1789 can be 
conveniently divided into three periods: the col­
onial period (up to 1775), the revolutionary 
period (1775 -1781), and the confederation 
period (1781-1789). Each period is distinctive, 
and while some historians have treated all 
three, many have confined themselves to one or 
the other. 
The colonial period contained the greatest 
variety of monetary practices, but these can be 
roughly divided into three categories. 
(I) Manipulation of the unit of account 
The monetary standard for accounting pur­
poses in the colonies was the English pound, 
shilling, and pence. However, most of the coins 
in the colonies were Spanish or Portuguese. The 
standard Spanish dollar contained 387 grains of 
silver, while the English silver shilling weighed 
86 grains. Therefore a dollar should have been 
worth four shillings and six pence. The col­
onies, in the hope of attracting foreign coin and 
specie, arbitrarily overvalued the dollar in 
terms of shillings, or in other words, devalued 
the unit of account. This technique was first 
adopted in 1642 when Massachusetts declared 
the Spanish dollar equal to five shillings. Other 
methods used to attain the same results were, 
instead of devaluing the shilling in terms of 
dollars, to devalue the shilling in terms of silver 
or gold. Either way, the process led to com­
peting devaluations, as high as seven shillings 
and six pence to the dollar, and different 
monetary standards in each colony. Another 
expedient employed to hold coins by the col­
onies was to forbid their export. 
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(2) Bills of credit 
Bills of credit were simply fiat paper money. 
They were issued in one of two ways. One way 
was for the government to print the money and 
then spend it to cover expenditures, usually the 
financing of a war effort. Future taxes would 
be pledged towards retiring the bills. The bills 
would be withdrawn from circulation by being 
paid directly as taxes or by being redeemed in 
specie that had been collected through taxes. 
Often, however, when the pledged taxes came 
due, the bills would be reissued rather than 
withdrawn. This type of currency finance was 
first employed in Massachusetts in 1690 and 
eventually embraced at one time or another by 
all the colonies.'" 
The other way of issuing bills of credit was 
through land banks. Instead of spending the 
money directly, the issuer would loan the 
money out at interest with land as security. 
When the principal on the loan was repaid, the 
bills might either be reloaned or retired. The 
issuer could be a group of private individuals or 
the government. Although private land banks 
were frequently proposed, they only operated 
briefly during the 1740s in Massachusetts."' 
Government land banks appeared in all the 
colonies. 
It should be noted that the term "bills of 
credit" is used here in the generic sense, in­
cluding both types of paper money. Sometimes 
the term is used to refer only to paper money 
paid out directly to cover government expenses. 
The term is a misnomer, anyway, because in 
neither case was the bill of credit a credit instru­
ment. It did not represent borrowings of the 
government repayable in money at some future 
date; it was money. This was true despite the 
fact that bills of credit sometimes paid interest. 
Colonial governments also engaged in actual 
borrowing. For this they issued treasury notes 
comparable to private bills of exchange, and 
these, of course, were credit instruments and 
not money. Unfortunately, the colonial govern­
ments blurred the distinction between credit 
transactions (involving the exchange of a pre­
sent good for a claim to a future good) and cur­
rent transactions (involving the exchange of a 
present good for a present good) not only by 
paying interest on some bills of credit but also 
by issuing so-called "treasury notes" that were, 
in fact, paper money. 
(3) Legal tender 
Although often treated in conjun'ction with 
bills of credit, the practice of legal tender is 
conceptually distinct. Legal tender could be of 
two types. Public legal tender established what 
would be accepted as money for payment of 
taxes, quit-rents, and other public levies. By 
declaring something public legal tender, the 
government obviously helped foster its use as 
money. Private legal tender decreed what the 
government would permit to be used in the pay­
ment of debts and the fulfillment of contracts. 
It had the effect of fixing the value of the 
monetary good in terms of the unit of account. 
For instance, when tobacco was declared legal 
tender, it had to be set at a certain rate of 
pounds of tobacco to shillings. This fixed rate 
was either set by statute or left up to the courts. 
If two or more goods were legal tender, then the 
exchange rate between them was officially fix­
ed. Exchange rates set by statute never coincid­
ed with market exchange rates; exchange rates 
set on an ad hoc basis by the courts might 
possibly do so. The discrepancy between legal 
and market rates of exchange was the source of 
perennial complaints by creditors, because it 
allowed debtors to pay their debts with over· 
valued money. Private legal tender at different 
times was used to fix the exchange rates bet· 
ween quite a variety of goods: wampum and 
specie, tobacco and specie, heavy coins and 
light coins, paper money and specie, gold and 
silver, etc. Paper money was frequently, but 
not always, declared private legal tender by the 
issuing colony. De facto, paper money was 
always public legal tender (if only at the loan 
bank that had issued it or for the taxes pledged 
toward its redemption), although Parliamen­
tary restrictions prevented this from always be­
ing formally admitted. 
Other monetary experiments of limited scope 
and less interest include Massachusetts' suc· 
cessful but temporary running of a mint bet­
ween 1652 and 1684'" and Virginia's system of 
tobacco warehouses with fully backed 
warehouse receipts circulating as money 
substitutes. 
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Great Britain also had an impact on its col­
onies' monetary practices. Throughout the col­
onial period, Britain prohibited the export of 
English coins to the colonies and 'forbade the 
establishment of colonial mints. Too much, 
however, has been made of these restrictions. 
The ban on exports applied only to British 
coins, and not to specie, which could be freely 
exported. Thus, British coins could be melted 
down and exported without hindrance. Also, 
the restriction did not apply to foreign coins. 
England looked askance at the colonies' 
competitive devaluations of their units of ac­
count, and in 1704, the Crown proclaimed that 
six shillings to the dollar was the maximum 
devaluation permitted. Because of widespread 
evasion, Parliament enacted this proclamation 
into law in 1707. 
The British government was particularly 
unhappy with colonial bills of credit. At first it 
attempted to restrain the colonies through in­
structions to the royal governors and suspen­
sion clauses. When this proved ineffective, 
Parliament passed the Currency Act of 1751. 
This act applied only to New England. It con­
fined the issue of paper money solely to impor­
tant government expenses, it placed limits on 
the quantity issued and the period of redemp­
tion, and it barred making paper money 
private legal tender. The Currency Act of 1764 
covered the rest of the coloaies, and it pro­
hibited making bills of credit legal tender, 
public or private. 
During the revolutionary period, the Con­
tinental and state governments financed the war 
effort through massive emissions of bills of 
credit. A serious hyperinflation resulted. All 
states made the bills of credit legal tender, and 
most of them instituted formal price fixing. 
Eventually, the paper money became worthless. 
At the end of the revolutionary period, the 
Bank of North America was founded. It was a 
nationally chartered bank which loaned out 
paper money bank notes. It operated with a 
fractional specie reserve, and most of its loans 
were made to the government. The remainder 
were made to private individuals against 
various forms of security. 
With the confederation period, not only had 
the emission of Continental paper money ceas­
ed, but the Bank of North America lost its na­
tional charter and became a state chartered in­
stitution. National coinage legislation was 
discussed, but nothing was enacted. Many of 
the states returned to the issue of bills of credit. 
Three states chartered banks. 
II 
During the colonial period, monetary policy 
was an important and controversial issue. The 
debate was recorded in a rich pamphlet 
literature. On the hard-money side, the leading 
partisan was Dr. William Douglass, a Scottish 
physician and scientist who had settled in 
Boston. His most famous pamphlet, "A 
Discourse Concerning the Currencies of the 
British Plantations in America", was published 
in 1740. In it, he contended that "There can 
therefore be no other proper Medium of Trade, 
but Silver, or Bills of Exchange and Notes of 
Hand payable in Silver at a certain U'sos or 
Period, which by a currant Discount are reduci­
ble to Silver ready Money, at any Time." He 
held paper money in scorn. "To make a Bill or 
Note bearing no Interest and not payable till 
after a dozen or score of Years, a legal 
Tender ... in Payment of Debts, is the highest 
of despotick and arbitrary Government."''' 
Douglass felt that increasing the quantity of 
money only depreciated the value of each 
monetary unit and caused price inflation. Infla­
tion hurt creditors, laborers, and those living 
on fixed incomes, and represented an insidious 
form of taxation. Legal tender laws coupled 
with paper money drove specie out of circula­
tion, increased the foreign exchange rate, and 
brought about an unfavorable balance of trade. 
Only a specie currency could maintain stable 
prices, attract specie, and balance foreign 
trade. If banks issued paper money, it must be 
backed by a fractional specie reserve. 
Douglass' most formidable opponent was 
Benjamin Franklin. His "Modest Enquiry into 
the Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency" 
appeared in Philadelphia in 1729 and has 
become a classic. Franklin argued that "There 
is a certain proportinate Quantity of Money re­
quisite to carry on the Trade of Country freely 
and currently; More than which would be of no 
Advantage in Trade, and Less, if much less, ex­
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ceedingly detrimental to it. " 1' 1 The colonies 
suffered from a scarcity of money, brought on 
by an unfavorable balance of trade, and this 
scarcity depressed the economy. Issuing paper 
inoney brought economic prosperity and, if 
done in moderation, could avoid depreciation. 
In addition, since paper money was cheaper, it 
provided the benefits of a medium of exchange 
at far less cost than specie. 
The pamphlets of Franklin and Douglass 
show the emergence of two opposing schools: 
the advocates of hard (metallic) money and the 
advocates of managed money. Without too 
much simplification, most historians treating 
this question fall into one of these two schools. 
Variations exist within each position, but most 
of the arguments that historians subsequently 
adopted were anticipated by Douglass or 
Franklin. 
III 
The hard-money school's interpretation 
developed earliest. Its theoretical underpinning 
was the quantity theory of money, which states 
that the value of money depends upon the sup­
ply of money and the demand for it. If the sup­
ply decreases, other things remaining equal, the 
value of money will go up and the price of 
goods will fall. Conversely, if the quantity of 
money is increased, the value of money will fall 
and prices rise. Modern writers often accuse the 
old hard-money advocates of using a crude 
quantity theory in which the demand for money 
is ignored. This is untrue; even the earliest 
statements of the quantity theory make explicit 
the ceteris paribus assumption on which they 
are based. The old hard-money theoreticians 
did not ignore the demand for money; they 
merely thought that it was fairly stable in the 
short-teFm, a question which economists still 
argue over. 
The hard-money school's policy goal was 
money that maintained a stable value. Whether 
this goal was achieved could be measured in 
two ways, by the stability of the exchange rate 
between colonial monies and English money or 
by the stability_ of prices. Hard-money writers 
usually focused on one or the other, although a 
few considered both. The policy prescription 
most likely to achieve this goal, according to 
these writers, was the adoption of the precious 
metals, gold or silver, as the monetary stan­
dard. If governments were permitted to print 
money, they would inevitably print too much 
and cause depreciation. Only specie could be 
relied upon to provide stability. 
William M. Gouge, the Jacksonian 
economist, was the first hard-money theoreti­
cian to write a monetary history of the United 
States. Published in 1833, it was entitled A 
Short History ofPaper Money and Banking in 
the United States.'" Gouge's initial four 
chapters are on colonial commodity money, 
colonial paper money, Continental paper 
money, and the Bank of North America, 
respectively. Although now outdated, Gouge's 
historical research was impressive for the time. 
He condemned legal tender laws, devaluations 
of the unit of account, and bills of credit. He 
included tables showing the depreciation of 
both colonial and Continental paper money. 
He even attacked the Bank of North America. 
In that respect he went much further than 
Douglass before him or most hard-money 
writers afterwards by consistently opposing all 
paper money, even when issued by banks with 
specie reserves. 
Despite its pioneering research, Gouge'S 
work was primarily polemicaL Following it, 
however, came several works devoted solely to 
historical scholarship. In 1839 Joseph B. Felt, a 
clergyman working in the Massachusetts ar­
chives, wrote An Historical Account of 
Massachusetts Currency.''' Henry Bronson ex­
amined the monetary records of Connecticut 
and published the results in the Papers of the 
New Haven Colony Historical Society in 
1865. 1' 1 The next year, John H. Hickcox's A 
History of the Bills of Credit or Paper Money 
Issued by New York from 1709to 17891" 1 ap­
peared. At the same time, Henry Phillips com­
piled the two volume Historical Sketches of 
Paper Currency of the American Colonies 
Prior to the Adoption of the Federal Constitu­
tion.'"' In his first volume, Phillips reprinted 
an 1837 pamphlet on Rhode Island by Elisha R. 
Potter,'"' and included essays of his own on 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Virginia, with a 
two page discussion of Vermont's paper-money 
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Continental money. 
Because these works were scholarly efforts 
and, more importantly, because they were less 
concerned with the economic impact of paper 
money than with the details of when bills were 
emitted and how many, their theoretical bias 
was not pronounced. Nevertheless, Felt, Bron­
son and Potter can be placed without reserva­
tion in the hard-money camp. ~hillips and 
Hickcox are not as easy to position. Phillips did 
condemn as harmful the issues of Virginia, New 
Jersey, and the Continental Congress, but with 
Pennsylvania, a colony noted for the restraint 
of its policies and the relative lack of deprecia­
tion by its currency, he concluded that the issue 
of fiat money was prudent and successful. 
Hickcox reached a similar conclusion with 
regard to New York. 
In 1874, William Graham Sumner made a 
brief monetary survey of the period prior to 
1789 in A History of American Currency. 1131 
This work, as Sumner himself admitted, was 
sketchy and rough, merely pointing the direc­
tion toward further research. Its treatment of 
both the colonial and confederation periods 
focused mostly on New England and took a 
hard-money attitude. One of Sumner's conten­
tions was that the unfavorable balance of trade 
of the colonies was due to a preference for 
foreign goods and capital over specie on the 
part of the colonists. The first edition of Albert 
S. Bolles' The Financial History of the United 
States'"' was published also in 1874. Bolles 
dismissed the colonial experience with the state­
ment: "Paper money had been tried in all the 
Colonies, and nowhere had the experiment 
worked satisfactorily, save in 
Pennsylvan~a." 1 " 1 His first volume, based on 
much new research, covered national finance 
during the revolutionary and confederation 
periods and confirmed the hard-money posi­
tion. Sumner examined the same territory in 
even greater detail in his two volume The 
Financier and Finances of the American 
Revolution. 1" 1 These volumes, unlike his 
previous work, were scholarly and authorita­
tive. The book combined a financial 
history of the American Revolution with a 
biography of Robert Morris. In it emerged 
what has become the standard interpretation. 
The Continental paper money used to finance 
the Revolution was seriously over-issued and 
generated a hyperinflation. Sumner denounced 
paper money for causing a Hsocial palsy" .11 71 
He took a favorable view of Morris and ap­
proved of the Bank of North America as a 
sound financial scheme. Charles J. Bullock 
took nearly the identical stance in his work on 
the same topic, The Finances of the United 
States from 1775 to 1789, With Especial 
Reference to the Budget. 1" 1 His work only dif­
fered from Sumner's in that it was an institu­
tional rather than a political history. Another 
institutional history relating to national finance 
published at this time was Lawrence Lewis, 
Jr.'s brief History of the Bank of North 
America: The First Bank Chartered in the 
United States. 1" 1 Lewis viewed his subject 
positively. 
While Bolles, Sumner, and Bullock were 
working out the hard-money position on na­
tional finance, a number of studies bolstered 
the hard-money case at the state and colonial 
level. Charles H. J. Douglas' The Financial 
History of Massachusetts from the Organiza­
tion of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to the 
American Revolution'"' gave extensive space 
to monetary affairs. Douglas blamed 
Massachusetts' paper-money policies on the 
masses of impoverished debtors. William 
Zebina Ripley's The Financial History of 
Virginia, 1609-17761" 1 devoted two chapters 
to monetary issues. Ripley praised Virginia, the 
last colony to issue bills of credit, for avoiding 
the temptation for so long. C. W. Macfarlane, 
in his article on "Pennsylvania Paper Curren­
cy", 12:21 presented extensive price series for 
many commodities. Macfarlane's price infor­
mation was taken from colonial newspapers 
and was amazingly complete. Although a hard­
money advocate, Macfarlane was forced to ad­
mit that bills of credit had suffered little 
depreciation in Pennsylvania. "The most 
strenuous opponents of paper money will hard­
ly deny, that under such circumstances [as 
prevailed in Pennsylvania] the value of almost 
any currency might be maintained. The dif­
ficulty is, that few legislative bodies are likely to 
be as wise as the Assembly of Pennsylvania 
seems to have been during this period.""" 
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Frank Fenwick McLeod wrote "The History of 
Fiat Money and Currency Inflation in New 
England from 1620 to 1789" .1" 1 He found that 
the "fluctuating and complicated currency 
retarded business and crippled commerce ... 
Inflation was triumphant, business 
paralyzed"."" Charles Bullock gathered 
together three of his studies in his Essays on the 
Monetary History of the United States.'"' Two 
of them g~.ve the history of paper money in 
states that hacf not previously been treated, 
North Carolina and New Hampshire. The 
third, "Three Centuries of Cheap Money in the 
United States", was a general commentary. 
The culmination of these colony and state 
studies, and perhaps the premier work of the 
hard-money school, was the massive two 
volume Currency and Banking in the Province 
of Massachusetts Bay by Andrew McFarland 
Davis.'"' Imposingly researched, it examined 
in detail the political struggles surrounding 
Massachusetts' currency and banking legisla­
tion through the Parliamentary ban of 1751. It 
also surveyed policies in other New England 
colonies. It analyzed the economic conse­
quences of the various policies, blaming the 
bills of credit for driving specie out of circula­
tion and raising exchange rates. Davis' resear­
ches led to his editing, in four volumes under 
the title of Colonial Currency Reprints, 
1682- 1751, 1" 1 the colonial pamphlet literature 
on money. 
Eventually, the hard-money position found 
its way into more general secondary works and 
texts. One of the most popular of these was 
Horace White's Money and Banking: Il­
lustrated by American History.'"' White 
devoted several chapters to colonial commodity 
money, legal tender, bills of credit, colonial 
banking, and the Bank of North America. 
"The pamphlets and records of the colonial 
period are filled with accounts of the distress 
and demoralization caused by depreciated 
paper made legal tender", he wrote; "the emis­
sion of bills of credit on loan was, in effect, a 
conspiracy of needy landowners against the rest 
of the community.""" Later editions of A. 
Barton Hepburn's A History ofCurrency in the 
United States'"' also included chapters presen­
ting the hard-money line on colonial and Con­
tinental paper money. Hepburn even denounc­
ed the practices of Pennsylvania. Finally, the 
hard-money case was cautiously but ably 
defended in Davis Rich Dewey's Financial 
History of the United States."'' 
One notion that has often been attributed to 
the hard-money school is that paper money was 
always instituted at the behest of poor, agrarian 
debtors. The hard-money school did recognize 
that depreciating money helped debtors and 
hurt creditors, giving debtors an incentive for 
supporting paper money, but they did not 
necessarily equate debtor interests with 
agrarian or lower-class interests. Only Douglass, 
Bullock, and White hinted at such an explana­
tion, and none of them developed it at any 
length. If the poor-agrarian-debtor thesis came 
to dominate historical interpretations, the hard­
money school is not responsible. The respon­
sibility really belongs to the historians of the 
progressive school, none of whom wrote 
specifically on money. 
IV 
After the turn of the century, the hard­
money school began to lose its prominence. 
This was in part due to the increasing popular­
ity of the ideas of managed money. Even before 
the Keynesian revolution, economists were con­
cluding that government management of the 
money supply would be much more efficient 
than reliance upon the precious metals. The 
first signs of a shift in historical interpretation 
came with the publication of several new colony 
studies. Clarence P. Gould's Money and 
Transportation in Maryland, 1720-17651331 
appeared in 1915, and in 1923 Kathryn L. 
Behrens published her Paper Money in 
Maryland, 1727 -1789.'" 1 Gould, who devoted 
only one chapter to transportation, was almost 
ecstatic over Maryland's paper-money policy. 
"Considering the peculiar benefits to grain and 
tobacco culture, the conveniences offered to 
trade, the exceptionally high exchange that the 
bills maintained throughout most of their life, 
and the faithful redemption of every shilling at 
face value, it is hardly too much to say that this 
was the most successful paper money issued by 
any of the colonies. "(3s1 Behrens, whose study 
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extended into the revolutionary period, was on­
ly slightly less enthusiastic, and she agreed that 
''As a colony Maryland had solved the problem 
of paper currency."[ 36 1 Although not as 
substantial as the studies of Gould and 
Behrens, Richard S. Rodney's Colonial 
Finances in Delaware[ 371 also saw paper money 
as necessary and beneficial. Another state study 
published about the same time was William 
Estill Heath's article, "The Early Colonial 
Money System of Georgia", a purely descrip­
tive account that took no position on the 
desirability of paper money.[ 38 1 
In 1934 Curtis Putnam Nettels applied the 
new interpretation foreshadowed in the works 
of Gould and Behrens to all the colonies. His 
book, The Money Supply of the American Col­
onies Before 1720, [391 was the first general 
treatment from the managed-money school. 
Actually, over half the book discussed not the 
colonial money supply but the colonial balance 
of payments. Nettels' consideration of this 
issue, however, provided the groundwork for 
his argument that the unfavorable balance of 
payments caused a chronic shortage of money 
in the colonies: 
The colonies - as a debtor region - were con­
fronted with a continuous adverse balance of 
payments, and their available specie was repeatedly 
drawn away to creditors in Europe. The scarcity of 
specie in America gave birth to a widespread belief that 
prices of colonial products were ruinously low because 
money was wanting. . . One solution of these dif­
ficulties appeared to be an enlargement of the volume 
of currency.l"l 
On this basis, Nettels justified all of the col­
onial monetary experiments: the making of 
commodity money legal tender, the devaluation 
of the unit of account, and the issue of bills of 
credit. All of them were efforts by the colonists 
to attain some economic independence. 
Even more outspoken in his defense of col­
onial monetary practices was the economist 
Richard A. Lester. In his book, Monetary Ex­
periments: Early American and Recent Scan­
dinavian, [411 he refined Nettels' argument 
about the shortage of money. Precious metals 
were too expensive a form of money for the col­
onies. By using cheaper paper money, the col­
onists were conserving resources and making 
themselves wealthier. Previous historians had 
distorted the colonial experience by ignoring 
the middle colonies. "Since there was relatively 
little depreciation in the middle colonies, most 
of the writers have played up the experience of 
the New England colonies. There the deprecia­
tion of the currency was more extreme." This 
was due to "a peculiar currency arrangement" 
in which "the paper money of each New 
England colony was freely accepted without 
discount in the other New England 
colonies". [421 Thus, each colony had a built-in 
incentive to issue bills of credit without 
restraint. The middle colonies, on the other 
hand, particularly Pennsylvania, used sound 
money management to avoid depressions and 
stimulate the economy. Lester argued that 
without currency emissions, prices would have 
fallen and depression would have resulted. In 
short, "our colonial forefathers were much 
more intelligent on money matters than hither­
to they have been given credit for being" .[ 431 
Although he provided a strong theoretical 
justification for the managed-money school, 
Lester's research was limited. The work that 
finally nailed down the managed-money inter­
pretation historically was Leslie Van Horn 
Brock's dissertation, "The Currency of the 
American Colonies, 1700- 1764: A Study in 
Colonial Finance and Imperial Relations". [441 
Overlapping and bringing forward Nettels' ac­
count through the Currency Act of 1764, it was 
thoroughly researched and has become the 
standard treatment of the subject. It gave a 
history of the monetary policies in each colony, 
in the process confirming the conclusion that 
on the whole paper money was salutary. 
Because of the specie drain, it was needed, and 
most colonies issued it with enough restraint to 
be successful. 
Although the managed-money triumvirate of 
Nettels, Lester, and Brock has supplanted the 
hard-money school, both groups share certain 
principles. Both accept the quantity theory of 
money, and both have, at least implicitly, 
stability of purchasing power as their policy ob­
jective. They differ as to the most efficient 
means of attaining that objective. Even on the 
historical record, their differences are not as 
great as at first they might seem. The hard­
money advocates freely admitted that the 
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monetary policy of Pennsylvania resulted in 
relatively less depreciation. As Gouge put it, 
''All things go by comparison. The credit bills 
of Pennsylvania were so much better than those 
of the other Governments, . . . but it was not a 
fact that they never sunk below the value of the 
gold and silver which was current in the colony 
before the first emission of its paper."[451 For 
the hard-money school, Pennsylvania's ex­
perience was exceptional; the prevailing tenden­
cy was toward massive depreciation. The 
managed-money school, on the other hand, ad­
mitted that even in Pennsylvania some fall in 
exchange rates took place- just not enough to 
be concerned about. They also agreed that in 
New England and during the Revolution too 
much money did result in serious inflation. For 
them, however, these cases were aberrations ex­
plained by extenuating circumstances (war, for 
instance); Pennsylvania's experience was 
typical. 
While Nettels, Lester, and Brock were revis­
ing the interpretation of colonial finance, a few 
historians were do~ng additional research on the 
revolutionary pt-riod. Ralph V. Harlow's 
"Some Aspects of Revolutionary Finance"[•eJ 
gave a broad overview of the issue of paper 
money by the Continental Congress and the 
various states. William B. Norton, in "Paper 
Currency in Massachusetts during the Revolu­
tion" ,[ 471 noted the relative conservatism of 
Massachusetts' monetary policies during the 
Revolution. Massachusetts placed greater 
reliance on borrowing than on bills of credit 
and attempted scrupulously to repay creditors. 
Neither of these works attempted to revise the 
previous negative historical verdict on revolu­
tionary bills of credit. Also important was 
Anne Bezanson's Prices and Inflation During 
the American Revolution, [481 which provided 
incredibly complete price series for the period. 
Earlier Bezanson had coauthored with Robert 
D. Gray and Miriam Hussey a similar book 
about Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania. [491 The 
Bezanson-Gray-Hussey series were those used 
by Lester in his study of Pennsylvania currency. 
William I. Davisson's "Essex County Price 
Trends: Money and Markets in 17th Century 
Massachusetts", [so] gave colonial price 
statistics for a different area and an earlier cen­
tury. Davisson's figures only went up to 1685, 
before the first paper-money emission, but they 
covered the years during which the 
Massachusetts mint operated, which Davisson 
felt had had a stabilizing influence on prices. 
The most recent study of colonial prices is John 
J. McCusker's Money and Exchange in Europe 
and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook.[ 511 
This monumental work of research gives series 
on the exchange rates between all the colonies 
and London, painstakingly pieced together 
from a huge array of contemporary 
quotations. 
Most of the research done after Nettels, 
Lester, and Brock has built upon or refined 
their approach. Theodore Thayer's general 
commentary on "The Land-Bank System in the 
American Colonies", [521 was not totally un­
critical. He felt that land banks had failed in 
New England, both because they over-issued 
money and because the security they required 
was inadequate. "Nevertheless, in four colonies 
-Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and 
Maryland - the system was on the whole suc­
cessful and is deserving of more attention than 
it has been given."[ 531 E. James Ferguson, in 
his "Currency Finance: An Interpretation of 
Colonial Monetary Practices" ,[ 541 ostensibly 
dealt with both the land bank and "currency 
finance" methods of emitting bills of credit, 
although he gave greater consideration to the 
latter. He surveyed the historical literature and 
did battle, again, with the hard-money school. 
"An effort will be made to show that in the 
middle colonies, from New York to Maryland, 
paper money was successful. Secondly, it will 
be argued that except in New England and the 
Carolinas, paper money did not engender any 
great conflict between broad classes of the 
population." [551 Ferguson later reworked his 
article and made it the first chapter of his book, 
The Power of the Purse: A History of 
American Public Finance, 1776- 1790. [561 The 
book was a welcome addition to the literature 
on finance during the revolutionary and con­
federation periods, but its analysis of the Con­
tinental inflation was quite standard. 
Ferguson's real contribution was his coverage 
of the debt and taxation questions. He also 
painted a less favorable picture of Robert Mor­
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ris than had Sumner. Bray Hammond's highly 
overrated Banks and Politics in America: From 
the Revolution to the Civil Warl 571 addressed its 
first two chapters to pre-1789 monetary history. 
Predictably, Hammond thought highly of the 
Bank of North America. He, alone among 
historians, even praised Rhode Island's emis­
sions of paper money. His main purpose, 
however, was to discredit the myth that paper 
money was supported by poor, agrarian 
debtors. On the contrary, the demand for paper 
money, claimed Hammond, whether bills of 
credit, Continentals, or bank notes, came from 
sophisticated merchants and commercial in­
terests. 
Of the few state studies done after 1941 when 
Brock wrote his dissertation, the only one not 
holding to the managed-money line was Donald 
L. Kemmerer's "Paper Money in New Jersey, 
1668- 1775". 1581 Kemmerer, in fact, found a 
boom- bust cycle accompanying New Jersey's 
paper money policies. When new paper-money 
was injected into the economy, an inflationary 
boom would result. When the money was 
redeemed, a deflationary depression followed. 
Kemmerer concluded that "the method of sud­
denly expanding and gradually contracting the 
paper-money supply was largely responsible for 
both evils" .1581 Peter E. Ellertsen, on the other 
hand, thought much more highly of New 
Jersey's policies in his article, "Prosperity and 
Paper Money: The Loan Office Act of 
1723". 1801 Looking at a shorter time span, he 
decided that the loan office was responsible for 
New Jersey's great prosperity. Richard M. 
Jellison's "Paper Currency in Colonial South 
Carolina: A Reappraisal" 1811 was also 
favorable. "The first period, from 1703 to 
1731, was one of much experimentation and 
may be characterized by depreciation. The 
years following 1731 witnessed not only com­
plete acceptance of the medium but also stabili­
ty in its value." 1821 Jellison's conclusions were 
significant because managed-money historians 
had usually conceded that South Carolina's 
paper-money policies were as bad as those in 
New England. 1831 
Bray Harnmond was probably the most vocal 
in his efforts to debunk the poor-agrarian­
debtor thesis, but he was not the most per­
suasive. Ten years earlier, Joseph Dorfman, in 
his examination of the colonial monetary 
debate in The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization, discovered that "Contrary to the 
tradition that historians have perpetuated, a 
critical analysis of the contemporary literature 
indicates that the proponents as well as the 
critics [of paper money] were not poor debtors 
or agrarians, but for the most part officials, 
ministers, merchants, and men of substance 
and learning in general". 1641 Dorfman's conclu­
sion was confirmed by George Athan Billias. In 
The Massachusetts Land Bankers of 1740,1651 
Billias systematically investigated the pro­
ponents and opponents of Massachusetts' 1740 
land-bank scheme and found that the poor­
agrarian-debtor thesis did not hold. Herman J. 
Belz, in two journal articles, 1661 extended the 
description of political forces battling over 
paper money in Massachusetts both forward 
and backward from 1740. Although he found 
some. agrarian support for paper money 
schemes, Belz agreed that the most significant 
support came from merchant groups. 
Along with the political forces within the col­
onies fighting over monetary policy, historians 
have explored the implications of the money 
issue for the colonial relationship with Great 
Britain. Some argue that the colonists' frustra­
tions with British monetary restrictions con­
tributed to the Revolution. Robert M. Weir 
found in his article, "North Carolina's Reac­
tion to the Currency Act of 1764,"1871 that this 
was true in North Carolina. Jack P. Greene and 
Richard J. Jellison, in "The Currency Act of 
1764 in Imperial- Colonial Relations, 
1764- 1776", 1681 examined the various eva­
sions of the Currency Act that occurred in all 
the colonies outside of New England and the 
colonial effort to get the act reinterpreted, 
modified, or repealed. They decided that the 
act was an important psychological irritant in 
British- American relations. Lawrence H. Gip­
son's "Virginia Planter Debts before the 
American Revolution" 1881 described the genesis 
of the Currency Act of 1764 and showed how it 
originated from the desire of British creditors 
to protect themselves from Virginia's monetary 
legislation. Jack M. Sosin's discussion of the 
Currency Act and the colonial reaction to it in 
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"Imperial Regulation of Colonial Paper 
Money, 1764-1773"1701 treated in less detail 
the material covered by Gipson and Greene and 
Jellison and reached the same conclusion. 
One area of monetary history that has cap­
tured the interest of at least one historian is 
counterfeiting. Counterfeiting was endemic in 
colonial and revolutionary America, and at 
times caused very serious problems for the col­
onies' paper money issues. The counterfeiting 
of Continentals was especially serious. Kenneth 
Scott investigated this topic in his book, 
Counterfeiting in Colonial America,l 71 1 and in 
numerous articles and monographs on in­
dividual colonies. 172 1 
Many of Scott's contributions appeared in 
numismatic journals, which have a special in­
terest in counterfeiting. Although largely ig­
nored by mainstream historians, the 
numismatic discussions of colonial money are 
excellent references. Often they are more com­
prehensive and thorough with regard to such 
matters as the dates, the quantities, and the 
denominations of paper money emissions. Eric 
P. Newman's The Early Paper Money of 
America is the standard numismatic guide, 
superseding all previous catalogues and pro­
viding extensive bibliographical references to 
the remainder of the numismatic literature. 1731 
v 
The writings on the political ramifications of 
monetary policy so far discussed - those of 
Billias, Greene and Jellison, Sosin, and the 
others - if not directly reinforcing the 
managed-money school's interpretation, are at 
least consistent with it. Only a few recent 
writings have contradicted the managed-money 
orthodoxy in any fashion. The first of these, M. 
L. Burstein's "Colonial Currency and Contem­
porary Monetary Theory: A Review 
Article", 1741 was highly technical and not based 
on a wide range of secondary material (let alone 
primary sources), but it did contain some 
thoughtful theorizing. Burstein compared 
figures on Pennsylvania's money supply with 
data on prices in Pennsylvania and England, 
the exchange rate, and interest rates. His con­
clusion was that "reasonably long-run 
elasticities of liquidity preference [were] very 
high indeed". I 75 J What that means is that 
changes in the money supply did not matter. In 
the long-run, prices in Pennsylvania were com­
parable to those in London and the exchange 
rate was stable regardless of what happened to 
the quantity of money. By reaching this conclu­
sion, Burstein struck at the heart of both the 
hard-money and managed-money schools. In 
effect, the demand for money was so flexible 
that the colonists could absorb into their cash 
balances as much money as was printed and the 
much touted money shortgage was a mirage. 
This premise, that money does not matter, is 
such an important feature of modern Keynesian 
economics that it is a wonder that no one before 
had applied it to the colonial experience. Un­
fortunately, even if one accepted Burstein's 
theoretical pre:::nise, his use of limited data 
made his conclusions highly tentative. 
Another author who questioned the whole 
quantity-theory framework was Joseph Albert 
Ernst. One of Ernst's early contributions, an 
article entitled "Colonial Currency: A Modest 
Inquiry into the Uses of the Easy Chair and the 
Meaning of the Colonial System of Freely 
Floating International Exchange" ,1761 was a 
reply to Burstein. Ernst expanded the article in­
to a chapter of his book, Money and Politics in 
America, 1755-1775: A Study in the Currency 
Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of 
Revolution. 177 1 Like Burstein, Ernst contended 
that the quantity of money did not really matter 
internationally for the determination of ex­
change rates. Exchange rates were governed by 
changes in the balance of payments, which in 
turn were determined by the sale of colonial ex­
ports, the purchase of imports by colonists, and 
the inflow of English capital. Unlike Burstein, 
Ernst inconsistently maintained that the quanti­
ty of money did matter domestically, and he ac­
cepted the managed-money school's position 
on the necessity of printing money to alleviate 
the specie shortgage. The rest of his book was a 
discussion of the politics surrounding the Cur­
rency Act of 1764 in which Ernst argued for a 
new economic interpretation of the 
Revolution. 1781 He covered much the same ter­
ritory as Weir, Greene and Jellison, Gipson, 
and Sosin, but in doing so he presented an ac­
383 THE MONETARY HISTORY OF AMERICA TO 1789: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
count of colonial monetary practices that 
started in 1764, where Brock leaves off. 
While Burstein and Ernst both attacked the 
quantity-theory framework used by the hard­
money and managed-money schools, their 
policy recommendations were more congenial 
with managed money. In Ernst's case this 
followed from his acceptance of the domestic 
importance of the money supply. In Burstein's 
case, since the quantity of money does not mat­
ter, there could be no serious objection to in­
creasing it through the printing press. Only one 
recent writer has disputed the managed-money 
school's policy recommendations: Roger W. 
Weiss, in his article, "The Issue of Paper 
Money in the American Colonies, 
1720-1774". 1791 Weiss argued that the col­
onies suffered from no real scarcity of specie. 
Using data from Pennsylvania and Boston, he 
attempted to demonstrate that even without the 
emission of paper money, prices would have 
risen rather than fallen. 1801 Colonial money 
issues were not well managed anyway; "Their 
volume changed erratically and with a large 
amplitude." This was due to the fact that "the 
issues were made to meet the needs of the col­
onial treasuries and these needs rose greatly in 
times of war" _18 11 He adds that "it should be 
clear that a monetary system, the changes in 
whose issues of paper money depend on the er­
ratic fiscal needs of government, will not very 
well serve the need for maintaining a stable 
money supply or of balancing the international 
movements of specie". 1821 By casting doubt on 
the government's ability to manage the money 
and by denying the colonial shortage of specie, 
Weiss is resurrecting the hard-money approach. 
More recently, Weiss has bolstered his conclu­
sions with a study of "The Colonial Monetary 
Standard of Massachusetts". 183 1 
IV 
In appraising the state of historical research 
on money in America before 1789, one glaring 
deficiency is immediately obvious. There is no 
general overall treatment of the monetary prac­
tices in the states during the confederation 
period. Despite the seeming importance of this 
period toward influencing the monetary ar­
rangements in the Constitution, it is usually 
treated as an addendum to the revolutionary or 
colonial period. Some, though not all, of the 
state studies go through to 1789.1141 
The revolutionary period is adequately 
covered by both general and specific works, but 
they all share a common interpretation. All 
agree that bills of credit issued by the Continen­
tal and state governments resulted in a serious 
hyperinflation. Some controversy exists over 
the Bank of North America, the character of 
Robert Morris, and the necessity of bills of 
credit for the war effort, but the really in­
teresting questions in this period seem to lie 
outside the field of monetary history. 
In contrast to the two later periods, the col­
onial period has both an extensive literature 
and rousing controversy. The main problem is 
that the older works of the hard-money school 
are, for the most part, theoretically superior to 
the newer treatments by the managed-money 
school, but the newer treatments are historical­
ly sounder than the older, out of date works. 
To get a competely accurate picture of the col­
onial monetary experience, one must consult 
the newer works for data and the older works 
for theory. 
Consider some of the justifications for the 
colonial monetary policies that have graced the 
writings, from Franklin to Ferguson, of the 
managed-money school. By the far the most 
pervasive is the claim that due to an un­
favorable balance of trade, the colonies suf­
fered from a chronic shortage of money. The 
best rejoinder to that claim is still the one given 
by Adam Smith: "No complaint, however, is 
more common than that of a scarcity of money. 
Money, like wine, must always be scarce with 
those who have neither wherewithal to buy it, 
nor credit to borrow it." 1851 
Money is a medium of exchange. When a 
good is used as money, it is desired so that it 
can be exchanged for other goods. It is not used 
up in consumption or production. Therefore, 
any stock of the monetary good, within certain 
very wide physical limits, can perform the 
monetary function with equal facility. There is 
no optimal supply of money. Increases in the 
stock of money confer no social benefit; 
decreases cause no harm. A smaller stock of 
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money simply requires that a given monetary 
unit have greater purchasing power or, in other 
words, that prices be lower. 
Most writers, even Sumner, White, and some 
of the other members of the hard-money 
school, have denigrated the colonial use of 
tobacco, wampum, and other commodities as 
money. They ignore that fact that all money, 
even gold and silver, emerges on the market 
when some commodity previously only used for 
consumption or production is employed as a 
medium of exchange because of its wide 
marketability. Gold and silver are more 
durable, portable, and divisible than other 
commodity monies, but the colonial use of their 
staples and other less satisfactory commodities 
as monies befitted their low level of economic 
development. The colonial domestic economy 
was just not that complex. 
The colonial trade with England and other 
areas, in contrast, was highly developed, and 
here it is argued that the colonists' unfavorable 
balance of trade drained away their specie. 
However, regional trade balances are merely 
aggregations of individual trade balances. 
Every individual has his own balance of 
payments for any given period, during which he 
will add to, subtract from, or leave unchanged 
his own cash holdings. Any net flows of money 
in regional balances of payment result solely 
from changes in the demand for money. Specie 
and foreign coins were readily available, and all 
that colonists had to do was to trade for them. 
The balance of trade was not an exogeneous 
condition foisted by circumstances upon the 
colonists; it resulted from their own market 
preferences. "The colonists evidently preferred 
to import British goods rather than invest in an 
improved domestic monetary system", point 
out James Shepherd and Gary Walton. "Their 
preference was to substitute other forms of 
media for specie, rather than to manage with 
less British and European manufactured 
goods."l 881 The lament that the colonists could 
not pay their debts to English merchants 
because an unfavorable balance of trade had 
drained off all their specie is no more valid than 
the excuse given by an individual debtor that he 
cannot repay the money he owes to a bank 
because he had an unfavorable balance of 
payments that month.l 871 
Another argument cites as evidence of a 
shortage of money the fact that interest rates 
were too high or that money was too "tight". 
This argument confuses a shortage of money 
with the scarcity of capital. The interest rate is 
not the price for money; rather it is the price in 
the time market. All individuals discount the 
future against the present, but different in­
dividuals do so at different rates. The interest 
rate is the premium received by savers for 
foregoing present consumption. Savings must 
occur for capital to accumulate, and high in­
terest rates indicate that immediate consump­
tion is more important to the economy than 
capital accumulation. The high interest rates in 
colonial America reflected the scarcity of 
capital. Usury laws probably converted the 
capital scarcity into a shortage, making savings 
unavailable at the legal rate. The way to 
alleviate the scarcity was - as happened 
through time - to save more capital. l88 1 
Printing new money can seemingly alleviate 
the scarcity of capital if it is injected through 
the loan market, as in the case of colonial land 
banks. The supply of loanable funds increases 
and the interest rate falls. However, this fall in 
interest is not matched by an increase in real 
saving. No one has foregone present consump­
tion. Therefore, the investments induced by the 
fall in interest rates are really malinvestments, 
misallocating resources. This generates a 
boom -bust trade cycle. The new money enters 
the loan market, interest rates fall, and in­
vestments are induced. As the new money cir­
culates throughout the economy, the new in­
vestments turn out to be malinvestments and 
they suffer losses; a depression results. l891 
This explains the apparent prosperity that 
followed the first emission of new money, and 
the boom -bust cycle noted by Kemmerer in 
New Jersey. It also exposes the fallacy in 
Lester's defense of managed money for preven­
ting depressions. Lester equates falling prices 
with depression. Actually, during several 
historical periods, secularly falling prices and 
economic prosperity have existed simultaneous­
ly. A depression is a cluster of business failures 
caused by the distortion of interest rates that 
accompanies the injection of new money in the 
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loan market. The prosperity of the boom phase 
of the cycle is merely an illusion. 
In one sense, however, the clamor over the 
shortage of money in the colonies was valid. 
Colonial governments were continuously ex­
periencing such a shortage. To finance a war 
through taxes collected in the form of tobacco 
or wampum was inconvenient and difficult. To 
require citizens who did not ordinarily use 
specie to pay taxes in that form was burden­
some. The connection between the colonial 
wars and the issue of paper money was no coin­
cidence, nor was the connection between over­
due tax debts and paper money in Shays' 
rebellion. Paper money was often demanded 
because it would make tax payments easier. In 
the case of the revolutionary bills of credit, 
paper money was issued in lieu of taxes 
altogether. 
When managed-money advocates argue that 
paper money is less expensive than specie, they 
are thinking in terms of macro-economic ag­
gregates that never influence people's economic 
actions. No one ever decides on the basis of the 
overall cost to society to use a paper shilling 
rather than a silver shilling. Individuals only act 
according to the specific array of costs and 
prices facing them, and if the prices they pay 
and earn are the same in both paper and silver 
shillings, then it will be a matter of indifference 
to them which they use. The important 
economic fact is that paper money is less expen­
sive to the person or institution issuing it. 
Specie can only be acquired by trading 
something that was produced for it. Paper 
money can just be created and spent. Conse­
quently, the issuing of paper money 
redistributes wealth and income. Economically, 
it is no different from counterfeiting. 
The hard-money school was correct in noting 
that paper money depreciates. The quantity 
theory of money holds true to the extent that 
prices are always higher after the issue of new 
money than they otherwise would have been. 
The price level, however, might not change 
dramatically because other factors go into its 
determination. By resting the case against paper 
money solely on depreciation, they left 
themselves open in those cases, like Penn­
sylvania, where the depreciation was relatively 
limited. Even if there is no depreciation, the 
printing of paper money always has distribu­
tion effects. It always shifts resources from pro­
ducers to the non-producing issuers and their 
privileged favorites. This makes paper money 
objectionable even when there is little deprecia­
tion. 
The first gainer is the issuer of paper money, 
who spends it for something he wants. Since he 
has produced nothing in exchange for the pur­
chased good, someone else must lose. This is 
accomplished either through a rise in prices, to 
the extent that the new money circulates, or a 
decrease in current consumption, to the extent 
that the new money is held in cash balances. In 
one case the new money creates a hidden tax on 
cash holdings; in the other, a forcible loan at 
zero interest. In addition to the first issuer, 
those whose incomes rise before the prices they 
pay also benefit. Those who are hurt the most 
are those facing prices that go up before their 
incomes. Individuals on fixed incomes lose. 
Debtors gain at the expense of creditors. Deb­
tors, furthermore, are not always poor, and 
quite often during the colonial period they were 
wealthy merchants and landowners. Merchants 
may be debtors and creditors both, and they 
may shift back and forth. If the new money is 
injected through the loan market, it temporarily 
lowers interest rates which benefits mer­
chants and businessmen who wish to expand 
their operations. The price of durable goods, 
like land, is very sensitive to interest rates. A 
fall in interest tends to raise the price of land, so 
landowners also benefit. 1901 Land speculators 
who are also debtors doubly benefit. Thus, the 
political revisionism of the managed-money 
school is the one area where their reinterpreta­
tion of events has merit. The support of 
wealthy merchants and landowners for paper 
money makes theoretical sense. 
A corollary of the quantity theory of money 
is the purchasing power parity theory, which 
claims that the exchange rate between coex­
isting monies will tend to equate to their pur­
chasing power. If dollars can buy five times 
more than shillings, then the exchange rate will 
tend to be five shillings per dollar. This theory 
allowed the hard-money school to measure the 
depreciation of paper money through the fall in 
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its exchange rate with English sterling. Ernst 
argued that the purchasing power parity theory 
is oversimplified; that exchange rates between 
London and America were determined by the 
value of imports bought, and the value of ex­
ports sold, and the value of capital flows. 
Ernst's argument is a non sequitur. No pur­
chasing power parity theorist has ignored the 
operation of supply and demand in the deter­
mination of exchange rates. These very forces 
are the ones that bring about purchasing power 
parity. 1911 • 
For example, if a colony should increase its 
money supply, the price of its domestic pro­
ducts will rise. This makes foreign goods 
relatively cheaper. Imports will increase, and 
exports will decrease. These factors combined 
will drive up the excqange rate until the point is 
reached where purchasing power parity is 
restored. If the exchange rate is not at parity, if 
for instance the dollar will buy only five times 
more than a shilling, but the exchange rate is six 
shillings per dollar, then individuals can profit 
by trading dollars for shillings and buying pro­
ducts. This lowers the shilling demand for 
dollars and products that can be bought with 
dollars and raises the dollar demand for shill­
ings and products that can be bought with shill­
ings. This will drive down the exchange rate 
toward five shillings per dollar. 192 J 
The purchasing power parity theory holds 
whether the monies coexist in the same 
geographical area or are employed mainly in 
different areas. Government fixing of the ex­
change rate is totally unnecessary. When the 
government does fix the exchange rate, it never 
fixes it at the market parity rate. As a conse­
quence, one of the monies is overvalued while 
the other is undervalued. In the example aboye, 
if the government fixed the rate at six shillings 
per dollar, shillings are artificially undervalued 
and dollars are artificially overvalued. In­
dividuals will increase their demand for shill­
ings and decrease their demand for dollars. Any 
price denominated at the fixed rate of six shill­
ings to the dollar when the market rate is five 
shillings to the dollar will be paid in dollars. 
Since the exchange rate cannot adjust, a surplus 
of dollars and a shortage of shillings will 
emerge. This result is a classic illustration of 
Gresham's Law; bad money has driven out 
good, or more precisely stated, money ar­
tificially overvalued by government has driven 
out of circulation money artificially under­
valued. 
The monetary history of the colonies offers 
many demonstrations of the operation of 
Gresham's Law. Through legal tender laws the 
exchange rate between different monies was fix­
ed. Usually specie was artificially undervalued. 
Tobacco drove out specie, or paper money 
drove out specie, or light coins drove out heavy 
coins. The colonial juggling of the unit of ac­
count was a special kind of rate fixing. It did 
not usually fix the exchange rate between two 
different monies, because the colonial shillings 
were allowed to float in terms of British shill­
ings, but merely changed the denomination of 
the existing money. Suddenly, a coin that was 
previously worth five shillings was now worth 
six shillings. This encouraged the importation 
of coins, gave a boost to exports, and 
discouraged imports. The effect was tem­
porary, however as prices would immediately 
rise in terms of the new unit of account so that 
the same coin would purchase the same quanti­
ty of goods as before. 
In short, the hard-money school was basical­
ly correct. The colonial - and revolutionary ­
monetary experience was a continuous stream 
of government failures. There was no shortage 
of money. That complaint provided the excuse 
for governments and special interests to 
plunder the economy through the printing of 
paper money. In the New England colonies, the 
depreciation was so severe that the monetary 
system was nearly wrecked, as it finally was 
throughout America during the Revolution. 
Even though depreciation was more mild in the 
middle colonies, the printing of money still had 
distribution effects. In all the colonies, the 
monetary policies were erratic and subservient 
to the fiscal appetite of governments. When 
bills of credit were emitted through land banks, 
they had the further undesirable effect of 
distorting interest rates. Paper money did not 
generate prosperity, it generated the 
boom- bust trade cycle. At the same time, legal 
tender laws drove specie out of circulation. On 
the whole, it was an abysmal record. 
387 THE MONETARY HISTORY OF AMERICA TO 1789: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
NOTES 
1. 	 The seminal work on Austrian monetary theory is Lud­
wig von Mises, The Theory ofMoney and Credit, new 
enl. ed., (1953; reprinted., New York, 1971). See also 
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extended into the revolutionary period, was on­
ly slightly less enthusiastic, and she agreed that 
''As a colony Maryland had solved the problem 
of paper currency."[ 36 1 Although not as 
substantial as the studies of Gould and 
Behrens, Richard S. Rodney's Colonial 
Finances in Delaware[ 371 also saw paper money 
as necessary and beneficial. Another state study 
published about the same time was William 
Estill Heath's article, "The Early Colonial 
Money System of Georgia", a purely descrip­
tive account that took no position on the 
desirability of paper money.[ 38 1 
In 1934 Curtis Putnam Nettels applied the 
new interpretation foreshadowed in the works 
of Gould and Behrens to all the colonies. His 
book, The Money Supply of the American Col­
onies Before 1720, [391 was the first general 
treatment from the managed-money school. 
Actually, over half the book discussed not the 
colonial money supply but the colonial balance 
of payments. Nettels' consideration of this 
issue, however, provided the groundwork for 
his argument that the unfavorable balance of 
payments caused a chronic shortage of money 
in the colonies: 
The colonies - as a debtor region - were con­
fronted with a continuous adverse balance of 
payments, and their available specie was repeatedly 
drawn away to creditors in Europe. The scarcity of 
specie in America gave birth to a widespread belief that 
prices of colonial products were ruinously low because 
money was wanting. . . One solution of these dif­
ficulties appeared to be an enlargement of the volume 
of currency.l"l 
On this basis, Nettels justified all of the col­
onial monetary experiments: the making of 
commodity money legal tender, the devaluation 
of the unit of account, and the issue of bills of 
credit. All of them were efforts by the colonists 
to attain some economic independence. 
Even more outspoken in his defense of col­
onial monetary practices was the economist 
Richard A. Lester. In his book, Monetary Ex­
periments: Early American and Recent Scan­
dinavian, [411 he refined Nettels' argument 
about the shortage of money. Precious metals 
were too expensive a form of money for the col­
onies. By using cheaper paper money, the col­
onists were conserving resources and making 
themselves wealthier. Previous historians had 
distorted the colonial experience by ignoring 
the middle colonies. "Since there was relatively 
little depreciation in the middle colonies, most 
of the writers have played up the experience of 
the New England colonies. There the deprecia­
tion of the currency was more extreme." This 
was due to "a peculiar currency arrangement" 
in which "the paper money of each New 
England colony was freely accepted without 
discount in the other New England 
colonies". [421 Thus, each colony had a built-in 
incentive to issue bills of credit without 
restraint. The middle colonies, on the other 
hand, particularly Pennsylvania, used sound 
money management to avoid depressions and 
stimulate the economy. Lester argued that 
without currency emissions, prices would have 
fallen and depression would have resulted. In 
short, "our colonial forefathers were much 
more intelligent on money matters than hither­
to they have been given credit for being" .[ 431 
Although he provided a strong theoretical 
justification for the managed-money school, 
Lester's research was limited. The work that 
finally nailed down the managed-money inter­
pretation historically was Leslie Van Horn 
Brock's dissertation, "The Currency of the 
American Colonies, 1700- 1764: A Study in 
Colonial Finance and Imperial Relations". [441 
Overlapping and bringing forward Nettels' ac­
count through the Currency Act of 1764, it was 
thoroughly researched and has become the 
standard treatment of the subject. It gave a 
history of the monetary policies in each colony, 
in the process confirming the conclusion that 
on the whole paper money was salutary. 
Because of the specie drain, it was needed, and 
most colonies issued it with enough restraint to 
be successful. 
Although the managed-money triumvirate of 
Nettels, Lester, and Brock has supplanted the 
hard-money school, both groups share certain 
principles. Both accept the quantity theory of 
money, and both have, at least implicitly, 
stability of purchasing power as their policy ob­
jective. They differ as to the most efficient 
means of attaining that objective. Even on the 
historical record, their differences are not as 
great as at first they might seem. The hard­
money advocates freely admitted that the 
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monetary policy of Pennsylvania resulted in 
relatively less depreciation. As Gouge put it, 
''All things go by comparison. The credit bills 
of Pennsylvania were so much better than those 
of the other Governments, . . . but it was not a 
fact that they never sunk below the value of the 
gold and silver which was current in the colony 
before the first emission of its paper."[451 For 
the hard-money school, Pennsylvania's ex­
perience was exceptional; the prevailing tenden­
cy was toward massive depreciation. The 
managed-money school, on the other hand, ad­
mitted that even in Pennsylvania some fall in 
exchange rates took place- just not enough to 
be concerned about. They also agreed that in 
New England and during the Revolution too 
much money did result in serious inflation. For 
them, however, these cases were aberrations ex­
plained by extenuating circumstances (war, for 
instance); Pennsylvania's experience was 
typical. 
While Nettels, Lester, and Brock were revis­
ing the interpretation of colonial finance, a few 
historians were do~ng additional research on the 
revolutionary pt-riod. Ralph V. Harlow's 
"Some Aspects of Revolutionary Finance"[461 
gave a broad overview of the issue of paper 
money by the Continental Congress and the 
various states. William B. Norton, in "Paper 
Currency in Massachusetts during the Revolu­
tion" ,[ 471 noted the relative conservatism of 
Massachusetts' monetary policies during the 
Revolution. Massachusetts placed greater 
reliance on borrowing than on bills of credit 
and attempted scrupulously to repay creditors. 
Neither of these works attempted to revise the 
previous negative historical verdict on revolu­
tionary bills of credit. Also important was 
Anne Bezanson's Prices and Inflation During 
the American Revolution, [481 which provided 
incredibly complete price series for the period. 
Earlier Bezanson had coauthored with Robert 
D. Gray and Miriam Hussey a similar book 
about Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania. [491 The 
Bezanson-Gray-Hussey series were those used 
by Lester in his study of Pennsylvania currency. 
William I. Davisson's "Essex County Price 
Trends: Money and Markets in 17th Century 
Massachusetts", [so] gave colonial price 
statistics for a different area and an earlier cen­
tury. Davisson's figures only went up to 1685, 
before the first paper-money emission, but they 
covered the years during which the 
Massachusetts mint operated, which Davisson 
felt had had a stabilizing influence on prices. 
The most recent study of colonial prices is John 
J. McCusker's Money and Exchange in Europe 
and America, 1600-1775: A Handbook.[ 511 
This monumental work of research gives series 
on the exchange rates between all the colonies 
and London, painstakingly pieced together 
from a huge array of contemporary 
quotations. 
Most of the research done after Nettels, 
Lester, and Brock has built upon or refined 
their approach. Theodore Thayer's general 
commentary on "The Land-Bank System in the 
American Colonies", [521 was not totally un­
critical. He felt that land banks had failed in 
New England, both because they over-issued 
money and because the security they required 
was inadequate. "Nevertheless, in four colonies 
-Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and 
Maryland - the system was on the whole suc­
cessful and is deserving of more attention than 
it has been given."[ 531 E. James Ferguson, in 
his "Currency Finance: An Interpretation of 
Colonial Monetary Practices" ,[ 541 ostensibly 
dealt with both the land bank and "currency 
finance" methods of emitting bills of credit, 
although he gave greater consideration to the 
latter. He surveyed the historical literature and 
did battle, again, with the hard-money school. 
"An effort will be made to show that in the 
middle colonies, from New York to Maryland, 
paper money was successful. Secondly, it will 
be argued that except in New England and the 
Carolinas, paper money did not engender any 
great conflict between broad classes of the 
population." [55 1 Ferguson later reworked his 
article and made it the first chapter of his book, 
The Power of the Purse: A History of 
American Public Finance, 1776- 1790. [561 The 
book was a welcome addition to the literature 
on finance during the revolutionary and con­
federation periods, but its analysis of the Con­
tinental inflation was quite standard. 
Ferguson's real contribution was his coverage 
of the debt and taxation questions. He also 
painted a less favorable picture of Robert Mor­
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ris than had Sumner. Bray Hammond's highly 
overrated Banks and Politics in America: From 
the Revolution to the Civil Warl 571 addressed its 
first two chapters to pre-1789 monetary history. 
Predictably, Hammond thought highly of the 
Bank of North America. He, alone among 
historians, even praised Rhode Island's emis­
sions of paper money. His main purpose, 
however, was to discredit the myth that paper 
money was supported by poor, agrarian 
debtors. On the contrary, the demand for paper 
money, claimed Hammond, whether bills of 
credit, Continentals, or bank notes, came from 
sophisticated merchants and commercial in­
terests. 
Of the few state studies done after 1941 when 
Brock wrote his dissertation, the only one not 
holding to the managed-money line was Donald 
L. Kemmerer's "Paper Money in New Jersey, 
1668- 1775". 1581 Kemmerer, in fact, found a 
boom- bust cycle accompanying New Jersey's 
paper money policies. When new paper-money 
was injected into the economy, an inflationary 
boom would result. When the money was 
redeemed, a deflationary depression followed. 
Kemmerer concluded that "the method of sud­
denly expanding and gradually contracting the 
paper-money supply was largely responsible for 
both evils" .1581 Peter E. Ellertsen, on the other 
hand, thought much more highly of New 
Jersey's policies in his article, "Prosperity and 
Paper Money: The Loan Office Act of 
1723". 1801 Looking at a shorter time span, he 
decided that the loan office was responsible for 
New Jersey's great prosperity. Richard M. 
Jellison's "Paper Currency in Colonial South 
Carolina: A Reappraisal" 1811 was also 
favorable. "The first period, from 1703 to 
1731, was one of much experimentation and 
may be characterized by depreciation. The 
years following 1731 witnessed not only com­
plete acceptance of the medium but also stabili­
ty in its value." 1821 Jellison's conclusions were 
significant because managed-money historians 
had usually conceded that South Carolina's 
paper-money policies were as bad as those in 
New England. 1831 
Bray Harnmond was probably the most vocal 
in his efforts to debunk the poor-agrarian­
debtor thesis, but he was not the most per­
suasive. Ten years earlier, Joseph Dorfman, in 
his examination of the colonial monetary 
debate in The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization, discovered that "Contrary to the 
tradition that historians have perpetuated, a 
critical analysis of the contemporary literature 
indicates that the proponents as well as the 
critics [of paper money] were not poor debtors 
or agrarians, but for the most part officials, 
ministers, merchants, and men of substance 
and learning in general". 1641 Dorfman's conclu­
sion was confirmed by George Athan Billias. In 
The Massachusetts Land Bankers of 1740,1651 
Billias systematically investigated the pro­
ponents and opponents of Massachusetts' 1740 
land-bank scheme and found that the poor­
agrarian-debtor thesis did not hold. Herman J. 
Belz, in two journal articles, 1661 extended the 
description of political forces battling over 
paper money in Massachusetts both forward 
and backward from 1740. Although he found 
some. agrarian support for paper money 
schemes, Belz agreed that the most significant 
support came from merchant groups. 
Along with the political forces within the col­
onies fighting over monetary policy, historians 
have explored the implications of the money 
issue for the colonial relationship with Great 
Britain. Some argue that the colonists' frustra­
tions with British monetary restrictions con­
tributed to the Revolution. Robert M. Weir 
found in his article, "North Carolina's Reac­
tion to the Currency Act of 1764,"1871 that this 
was true in North Carolina. Jack P. Greene and 
Richard J. Jellison, in "The Currency Act of 
1764 in Imperial- Colonial Relations, 
1764- 1776", 1681 examined the various eva­
sions of the Currency Act that occurred in all 
the colonies outside of New England and the 
colonial effort to get the act reinterpreted, 
modified, or repealed. They decided that the 
act was an important psychological irritant in 
British- American relations. Lawrence H. Gip­
son's "Virginia Planter Debts before the 
American Revolution" 1881 described the genesis 
of the Currency Act of 1764 and showed how it 
originated from the desire of British creditors 
to protect themselves from Virginia's monetary 
legislation. Jack M. Sosin's discussion of the 
Currency Act and the colonial reaction to it in 
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"Imperial Regulation of Colonial Paper 
Money, 1764-1773"1701 treated in less detail 
the material covered by Gipson and Greene and 
Jellison and reached the same conclusion. 
One area of monetary history that has cap­
tured the interest of at least one historian is 
counterfeiting. Counterfeiting was endemic in 
colonial and revolutionary America, and at 
times caused very serious problems for the col­
onies' paper money issues. The counterfeiting 
of Continentals was especially serious. Kenneth 
Scott investigated this topic in his book, 
Counterfeiting in Colonial America,l 71 1 and in 
numerous articles and monographs on in­
dividual colonies. 172 1 
Many of Scott's contributions appeared in 
numismatic journals, which have a special in­
terest in counterfeiting. Although largely ig­
nored by mainstream historians, the 
numismatic discussions of colonial money are 
excellent references. Often they are more com­
prehensive and thorough with regard to such 
matters as the dates, the quantities, and the 
denominations of paper money emissions. Eric 
P. Newman's The Early Paper Money of 
America is the standard numismatic guide, 
superseding all previous catalogues and pro­
viding extensive bibliographical references to 
the remainder of the numismatic literature. 1731 
v 
The writings on the political ramifications of 
monetary policy so far discussed - those of 
Billias, Greene and Jellison, Sosin, and the 
others - if not directly reinforcing the 
managed-money school's interpretation, are at 
least consistent with it. Only a few recent 
writings have contradicted the managed-money 
orthodoxy in any fashion. The first of these, M. 
L. Burstein's "Colonial Currency and Contem­
porary Monetary Theory: A Review 
Article", 1741 was highly technical and not based 
on a wide range of secondary material (let alone 
primary sources), but it did contain some 
thoughtful theorizing. Burstein compared 
figures on Pennsylvania's money supply with 
data on prices in Pennsylvania and England, 
the exchange rate, and interest rates. His con­
clusion was that "reasonably long-run 
elasticities of liquidity preference [were] very 
high indeed". I 75 J What that means is that 
changes in the money supply did not matter. In 
the long-run, prices in Pennsylvania were com­
parable to those in London and the exchange 
rate was stable regardless of what happened to 
the quantity of money. By reaching this conclu­
sion, Burstein struck at the heart of both the 
hard-money and managed-money schools. In 
effect, the demand for money was so flexible 
that the colonists could absorb into their cash 
balances as much money as was printed and the 
much touted money shortgage was a mirage. 
This premise, that money does not matter, is 
such an important feature of modern Keynesian 
economics that it is a wonder that no one before 
had applied it to the colonial experience. Un­
fortunately, even if one accepted Burstein's 
theoretical pre:::nise, his use of limited data 
made his conclusions highly tentative. 
Another author who questioned the whole 
quantity-theory framework was Joseph Albert 
Ernst. One of Ernst's early contributions, an 
article entitled "Colonial Currency: A Modest 
Inquiry into the Uses of the Easy Chair and the 
Meaning of the Colonial System of Freely 
Floating International Exchange" ,1761 was a 
reply to Burstein. Ernst expanded the article in­
to a chapter of his book, Money and Politics in 
America, 1755-1775: A Study in the Currency 
Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of 
Revolution. 177 1 Like Burstein, Ernst contended 
that the quantity of money did not really matter 
internationally for the determination of ex­
change rates. Exchange rates were governed by 
changes in the balance of payments, which in 
turn were determined by the sale of colonial ex­
ports, the purchase of imports by colonists, and 
the inflow of English capital. Unlike Burstein, 
Ernst inconsistently maintained that the quanti­
ty of money did matter domestically, and he ac­
cepted the managed-money school's position 
on the necessity of printing money to alleviate 
the specie shortgage. The rest of his book was a 
discussion of the politics surrounding the Cur­
rency Act of 1764 in which Ernst argued for a 
new economic interpretation of the 
Revolution. 1781 He covered much the same ter­
ritory as Weir, Greene and Jellison, Gipson, 
and Sosin, but in doing so he presented an ac­
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count of colonial monetary practices that 
started in 1764, where Brock leaves off. 
While Burstein and Ernst both attacked the 
quantity-theory framework used by the hard­
money and managed-money schools, their 
policy recommendations were more congenial 
with managed money. In Ernst's case this 
followed from his acceptance of the domestic 
importance of the money supply. In Burstein's 
case, since the quantity of money does not mat­
ter, there could be no serious objection to in­
creasing it through the printing press. Only one 
recent writer has disputed the managed-money 
school's policy recommendations: Roger W. 
Weiss, in his article, "The Issue of Paper 
Money in the American Colonies, 
1720-1774". 1791 Weiss argued that the col­
onies suffered from no real scarcity of specie. 
Using data from Pennsylvania and Boston, he 
attempted to demonstrate that even without the 
emission of paper money, prices would have 
risen rather than fallen. 1801 Colonial money 
issues were not well managed anyway; "Their 
volume changed erratically and with a large 
amplitude." This was due to the fact that "the 
issues were made to meet the needs of the col­
onial treasuries and these needs rose greatly in 
times of war" _18 11 He adds that "it should be 
clear that a monetary system, the changes in 
whose issues of paper money depend on the er­
ratic fiscal needs of government, will not very 
well serve the need for maintaining a stable 
money supply or of balancing the international 
movements of specie". 1821 By casting doubt on 
the government's ability to manage the money 
and by denying the colonial shortage of specie, 
Weiss is resurrecting the hard-money approach. 
More recently, Weiss has bolstered his conclu­
sions with a study of "The Colonial Monetary 
Standard of Massachusetts". 183 1 
IV 
In appraising the state of historical research 
on money in America before 1789, one glaring 
deficiency is immediately obvious. There is no 
general overall treatment of the monetary prac­
tices in the states during the confederation 
period. Despite the seeming importance of this 
period toward influencing the monetary ar­
rangements in the Constitution, it is usually 
treated as an addendum to the revolutionary or 
colonial period. Some, though not all, of the 
state studies go through to 1789.1141 
The revolutionary period is adequately 
covered by both general and specific works, but 
they all share a common interpretation. All 
agree that bills of credit issued by the Continen­
tal and state governments resulted in a serious 
hyperinflation. Some controversy exists over 
the Bank of North America, the character of 
Robert Morris, and the necessity of bills of 
credit for the war effort, but the really in­
teresting questions in this period seem to lie 
outside the field of monetary history. 
In contrast to the two later periods, the col­
onial period has both an extensive literature 
and rousing controversy. The main problem is 
that the older works of the hard-money school 
are, for the most part, theoretically superior to 
the newer treatments by the managed-money 
school, but the newer treatments are historical­
ly sounder than the older, out of date works. 
To get a competely accurate picture of the col­
onial monetary experience, one must consult 
the newer works for data and the older works 
for theory. 
Consider some of the justifications for the 
colonial monetary policies that have graced the 
writings, from Franklin to Ferguson, of the 
managed-money school. By the far the most 
pervasive is the claim that due to an un­
favorable balance of trade, the colonies suf­
fered from a chronic shortage of money. The 
best rejoinder to that claim is still the one given 
by Adam Smith: "No complaint, however, is 
more common than that of a scarcity of money. 
Money, like wine, must always be scarce with 
those who have neither wherewithal to buy it, 
nor credit to borrow it." 1851 
Money is a medium of exchange. When a 
good is used as money, it is desired so that it 
can be exchanged for other goods. It is not used 
up in consumption or production. Therefore, 
any stock of the monetary good, within certain 
very wide physical limits, can perform the 
monetary function with equal facility. There is 
no optimal supply of money. Increases in the 
stock of money confer no social benefit; 
decreases cause no harm. A smaller stock of 
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money simply requires that a given monetary 
unit have greater purchasing power or, in other 
words, that prices be lower. 
Most writers, even Sumner, White, and some 
of the other members of the hard-money 
school, have denigrated the colonial use of 
tobacco, wampum, and other commodities as 
money. They ignore that fact that all money, 
even gold and silver, emerges on the market 
when some commodity previously only used for 
consumption or production is employed as a 
medium of exchange because of its wide 
marketability. Gold and silver are more 
durable, portable, and divisible than other 
commodity monies, but the colonial use of their 
staples and other less satisfactory commodities 
as monies befitted their low level of economic 
development. The colonial domestic economy 
was just not that complex. 
The colonial trade with England and other 
areas, in contrast, was highly developed, and 
here it is argued that the colonists' unfavorable 
balance of trade drained away their specie. 
However, regional trade balances are merely 
aggregations of individual trade balances. 
Every individual has his own balance of 
payments for any given period, during which he 
will add to, subtract from, or leave unchanged 
his own cash holdings. Any net flows of money 
in regional balances of payment result solely 
from changes in the demand for money. Specie 
and foreign coins were readily available, and all 
that colonists had to do was to trade for them. 
The balance of trade was not an exogeneous 
condition foisted by circumstances upon the 
colonists; it resulted from their own market 
preferences. "The colonists evidently preferred 
to import British goods rather than invest in an 
improved domestic monetary system", point 
out James Shepherd and Gary Walton. "Their 
preference was to substitute other forms of 
media for specie, rather than to manage with 
less British and European manufactured 
goods."l 881 The lament that the colonists could 
not pay their debts to English merchants 
because an unfavorable balance of trade had 
drained off all their specie is no more valid than 
the excuse given by an individual debtor that he 
cannot repay the money he owes to a bank 
because he had an unfavorable balance of 
payments that month.l 871 
Another argument cites as evidence of a 
shortage of money the fact that interest rates 
were too high or that money was too "tight". 
This argument confuses a shortage of money 
with the scarcity of capital. The interest rate is 
not the price for money; rather it is the price in 
the time market. All individuals discount the 
future against the present, but different in­
dividuals do so at different rates. The interest 
rate is the premium received by savers for 
foregoing present consumption. Savings must 
occur for capital to accumulate, and high in­
terest rates indicate that immediate consump­
tion is more important to the economy than 
capital accumulation. The high interest rates in 
colonial America reflected the scarcity of 
capital. Usury laws probably converted the 
capital scarcity into a shortage, making savings 
unavailable at the legal rate. The way to 
alleviate the scarcity was - as happened 
through time - to save more capital. l88 1 
Printing new money can seemingly alleviate 
the scarcity of capital if it is injected through 
the loan market, as in the case of colonial land 
banks. The supply of loanable funds increases 
and the interest rate falls. However, this fall in 
interest is not matched by an increase in real 
saving. No one has foregone present consump­
tion. Therefore, the investments induced by the 
fall in interest rates are really malinvestments, 
misallocating resources. This generates a 
boom -bust trade cycle. The new money enters 
the loan market, interest rates fall, and in­
vestments are induced. As the new money cir­
culates throughout the economy, the new in­
vestments turn out to be malinvestments and 
they suffer losses; a depression results. l891 
This explains the apparent prosperity that 
followed the first emission of new money, and 
the boom -bust cycle noted by Kemmerer in 
New Jersey. It also exposes the fallacy in 
Lester's defense of managed money for preven­
ting depressions. Lester equates falling prices 
with depression. Actually, during several 
historical periods, secularly falling prices and 
economic prosperity have existed simultaneous­
ly. A depression is a cluster of business failures 
caused by the distortion of interest rates that 
accompanies the injection of new money in the 
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loan market. The prosperity of the boom phase 
of the cycle is merely an illusion. 
In one sense, however, the clamor over the 
shortage of money in the colonies was valid. 
Colonial governments were continuously ex­
periencing such a shortage. To finance a war 
through taxes collected in the form of tobacco 
or wampum was inconvenient and difficult. To 
require citizens who did not ordinarily use 
specie to pay taxes in that form was burden­
some. The connection between the colonial 
wars and the issue of paper money was no coin­
cidence, nor was the connection between over­
due tax debts and paper money in Shays' 
rebellion. Paper money was often demanded 
because it would make tax payments easier. In 
the case of the revolutionary bills of credit, 
paper money was issued in lieu of taxes 
altogether. 
When managed-money advocates argue that 
paper money is less expensive than specie, they 
are thinking in terms of macro-economic ag­
gregates that never influence people's economic 
actions. No one ever decides on the basis of the 
overall cost to society to use a paper shilling 
rather than a silver shilling. Individuals only act 
according to the specific array of costs and 
prices facing them, and if the prices they pay 
and earn are the same in both paper and silver 
shillings, then it will be a matter of indifference 
to them which they use. The important 
economic fact is that paper money is less expen­
sive to the person or institution issuing it. 
Specie can only be acquired by trading 
something that was produced for it. Paper 
money can just be created and spent. Conse­
quently, the issuing of paper money 
redistributes wealth and income. Economically, 
it is no different from counterfeiting. 
The hard-money school was correct in noting 
that paper money depreciates. The quantity 
theory of money holds true to the extent that 
prices are always higher after the issue of new 
money than they otherwise would have been. 
The price level, however, might not change 
dramatically because other factors go into its 
determination. By resting the case against paper 
money solely on depreciation, they left 
themselves open in those cases, like Penn­
sylvania, where the depreciation was relatively 
limited. Even if there is no depreciation, the 
printing of paper money always has distribu­
tion effects. It always shifts resources from pro­
ducers to the non-producing issuers and their 
privileged favorites. This makes paper money 
objectionable even when there is little deprecia­
tion. 
The first gainer is the issuer of paper money, 
who spends it for something he wants. Since he 
has produced nothing in exchange for the pur­
chased good, someone else must lose. This is 
accomplished either through a rise in prices, to 
the extent that the new money circulates, or a 
decrease in current consumption, to the extent 
that the new money is held in cash balances. In 
one case the new money creates a hidden tax on 
cash holdings; in the other, a forcible loan at 
zero interest. In addition to the first issuer, 
those whose incomes rise before the prices they 
pay also benefit. Those who are hurt the most 
are those facing prices that go up before their 
incomes. Individuals on fixed incomes lose. 
Debtors gain at the expense of creditors. Deb­
tors, furthermore, are not always poor, and 
quite often during the colonial period they were 
wealthy merchants and landowners. Merchants 
may be debtors and creditors both, and they 
may shift back and forth. If the new money is 
injected through the loan market, it temporarily 
lowers interest rates which benefits mer­
chants and businessmen who wish to expand 
their operations. The price of durable goods, 
like land, is very sensitive to interest rates. A 
fall in interest tends to raise the price of land, so 
landowners also benefit. 1901 Land speculators 
who are also debtors doubly benefit. Thus, the 
political revisionism of the managed-money 
school is the one area where their reinterpreta­
tion of events has merit. The support of 
wealthy merchants and landowners for paper 
money makes theoretical sense. 
A corollary of the quantity theory of money 
is the purchasing power parity theory, which 
claims that the exchange rate between coex­
isting monies will tend to equate to their pur­
chasing power. If dollars can buy five times 
more than shillings, then the exchange rate will 
tend to be five shillings per dollar. This theory 
allowed the hard-money school to measure the 
depreciation of paper money through the fall in 
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its exchange rate with English sterling. Ernst 
argued that the purchasing power parity theory 
is oversimplified; that exchange rates between 
London and America were determined by the 
value of imports bought, and the value of ex­
ports sold, and the value of capital flows. 
Ernst's argument is a non sequitur. No pur­
chasing power parity theorist has ignored the 
operation of supply and demand in the deter­
mination of exchange rates. These very forces 
are the ones that bring about purchasing power 
parity. 1911 • 
For example, if a colony should increase its 
money supply, the price of its domestic pro­
ducts will rise. This makes foreign goods 
relatively cheaper. Imports will increase, and 
exports will decrease. These factors combined 
will drive up the excqange rate until the point is 
reached where purchasing power parity is 
restored. If the exchange rate is not at parity, if 
for instance the dollar will buy only five times 
more than a shilling, but the exchange rate is six 
shillings per dollar, then individuals can profit 
by trading dollars for shillings and buying pro­
ducts. This lowers the shilling demand for 
dollars and products that can be bought with 
dollars and raises the dollar demand for shill­
ings and products that can be bought with shill­
ings. This will drive down the exchange rate 
toward five shillings per dollar.l92 1 
The purchasing power parity theory holds 
whether the monies coexist in the same 
geographical area or are employed mainly in 
different areas. Government fixing of the ex­
change rate is totally unnecessary. When the 
government does fix the exchange rate, it never 
fixes it at the market parity rate. As a conse­
quence, one of the monies is overvalued while 
the other is undervalued. In the example aboye, 
if the government fixed the rate at six shillings 
per dollar, shillings are artificially undervalued 
and dollars are artificially overvalued. In­
dividuals will increase their demand for shill­
ings and decrease their demand for dollars. Any 
price denominated at the fixed rate of six shill­
ings to the dollar when the market rate is five 
shillings to the dollar will be paid in dollars. 
Since the exchange rate cannot adjust, a surplus 
of dollars and a shortage of shillings will 
emerge. This result is a classic illustration of 
Gresham's Law; bad money has driven out 
good, or more precisely stated, money ar­
tificially overvalued by government has driven 
out of circulation money artificially under­
valued. 
The monetary history of the colonies offers 
many demonstrations of the operation of 
Gresham's Law. Through legal tender laws the 
exchange rate between different monies was fix­
ed. Usually specie was artificially undervalued. 
Tobacco drove out specie, or paper money 
drove out specie, or light coins drove out heavy 
coins. The colonial juggling of the unit of ac­
count was a special kind of rate fixing. It did 
not usually fix the exchange rate between two 
different monies, because the colonial shillings 
were allowed to float in terms of British shill­
ings, but merely changed the denomination of 
the existing money. Suddenly, a coin that was 
previously worth five shillings was now worth 
six shillings. This encouraged the importation 
of coins, gave a boost to exports, and 
discouraged imports. The effect was tem­
porary, however as prices would immediately 
rise in terms of the new unit of account so that 
the same coin would purchase the same quanti­
ty of goods as before. 
In short, the hard-money school was basical­
ly correct. The colonial - and revolutionary ­
monetary experience was a continuous stream 
of government failures. There was no shortage 
of money. That complaint provided the excuse 
for governments and special interests to 
plunder the economy through the printing of 
paper money. In the New England colonies, the 
depreciation was so severe that the monetary 
system was nearly wrecked, as it finally was 
throughout America during the Revolution. 
Even though depreciation was more mild in the 
middle colonies, the printing of money still had 
distribution effects. In all the colonies, the 
monetary policies were erratic and subservient 
to the fiscal appetite of governments. When 
bills of credit were emitted through land banks, 
they had the further undesirable effect of 
distorting interest rates. Paper money did not 
generate prosperity, it generated the 
boom- bust trade cycle. At the same time, legal 
tender laws drove specie out of circulation. On 
the whole, it was an abysmal record. 
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